Lecture 09: Shamir Secret Sharing (Introduction)

Shamir Secret Sharing

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- The objective of this new cryptographic primitive is to share a secret s among n people such that the following holds. The following conditions are satisfied for a fixed number t < n.
 - If < t parties get together, then they get no additional information about the secret.
 - If ≥ *t* parties get together, then they can correctly reconstruct the secret.
- In this lecture, we study an introductory version of this cryptographic primitive

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- We have seen that $(\mathbb{Z}_p, +, \times)$ is a field, when p is a prime
 - Recall that + is integer additional modulo the prime p
 - Recall that \cdot is integer multiplication modulo the prime p
 - For example, the additive inverse of x is (p x), for $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ (because $x + (p - x) = 0 \mod p$)
 - In the homework, you have shown that the multiplicative inverse of x is x^{p-2} , for $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ (i.e., $x \times (x^{p-2}) = 1 \mod p$)

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For a working example, suppose p = 5. Therefore, $x^{p-2} = x^3$ is the multiplicative inverse of x in $(\mathbb{Z}_5, +, \times)$

- The multiplicative inverse of 1 is $1^{p-2} = 1$, i.e. (1/1) = 1
- The multiplicative inverse of 2 is $2^{p-2} = 2 \times 2 \times 2 = 4 \times 2 = 3$, i.e. (1/2) = 3
- The multiplicative inverse of 3 is $3^{p-2} = 3 \times 3 \times 3 = 4 \times 3 = 2$, i.e. (1/3) = 2
- The multiplicative inverse of 4 is $4^{p-2} = 4 \times 4 \times 4 = 1 \times 4 = 4$, i.e. (1/4) = 4

Interpreting "fractions" over the field $(\mathbb{Z}_{p},+,\times)$

- When we write 4/3
- We mean $4 \cdot (1/3)$,
- That is 4 multiplied by the "multiplicative inverse of 3"
- That is 4 multiplied by 2 (because in the previous slide, we saw that the multiplicative inverse of 3 in $(\mathbb{Z}_5, +, \times)$ is 2)
- The answer, therefore, is 3 (because $4 \times 2 = 3 \mod 5$)

Note

While working over real numbers, we associate "4/3" to the fraction "1.333…," i.e. a fractional number. But when working over the field ($\mathbb{Z}_p, +, \times$) we will interpret the expression "4/3" as the number "4 \times mult-inv(3)"

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Coding Exercise

Students are highly encouraged to go to cocalc.com and explore field arithmetic using sage

Shamir Secret Sharing

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- Suppose a central authority *P* has a secret *s* (some natural number)
- The central authority wants to share the secret among *n* parties *P*₁, *P*₂, ..., *P_n* such that
 - **Privacy.** No party can reconstruct the secret *s*.
 - **Reconstruction.** Any two parties can reconstruct the entire secret *s*

Sharing Algorithm: SecretShare (*s*, *n*).

- Takes as input a secret s
- Takes as input *n*, the number of shares it needs to create
- Outputs a vector (s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n) the secret shares for each party

Reconstruction Algorithm: SecretReconstruct $(i_1, s^{(1)}, i_2, s^{(2)})$.

- Takes as input the identity i_1 of the first party and identity i_2 of the second party
- Takes as input their respective secrets $s^{(1)}$ and $s^{(2)}$
- \bullet Outputs the reconstructed secret \widetilde{s}
- The probability that the reconstructed secret \tilde{s} is identical to the original secret s is close to 1

The intuition underlying the construction:

- Given one point in a plane, there are a lot of straight lines passing through it (In fact, we need the fact that *every* length of the intercept on the Y-axis is equally likely)
- But, given two points in a plane, there is a *unique* line passing through it; thus the length of the intercept on the *Y*-axis is unique

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Let $(\mathbb{F}, +, \times)$ be a field such that $\{0, 1, \ldots, n\} \subseteq \mathbb{F}$ and the secret $s \in \mathbb{F}$. The secret-sharing algorithm is provided below. SecretShare (s, n).

- Choose a random line $\ell(X)$ passing through the point (0, s). Note that the equation of the line is $a \cdot X + s$, where a is randomly chosen from \mathbb{F}
- Evaluate the line $\ell(X)$ at X = 1, X = 2, ..., X = n to generate the secret shares $s_1, s_2, ..., s_n$. That is, $s_1 = \ell(X = 1), s_2 = \ell(X = 2), ..., s_n = \ell(X = n)$

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The reconstruction algorithm is provided below. SecretReconstruct $(i_1, s^{(1)}, i_2, s^{(2)})$.

• Compute the equation of the line

$$\ell'(X) := \frac{s^{(2)} - s^{(1)}}{i_2 - i_1} \cdot X + \left(\frac{i_2 s^{(1)} - i_1 s^{(2)}}{i_2 - i_1}\right)$$

• Let \tilde{s} be the evaluation of the line $\ell'(X)$ at X = 0. That is, return $\tilde{s} = \ell'(0) = \left(\frac{i_2 s^{(1)} - i_1 s^{(2)}}{i_2 - i_1}\right)$.

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Privacy Argument

Given the share of only one party (i₁, s⁽¹⁾), there is a unique line passing through the points (i₁, s⁽¹⁾) and (0, α), for every α ∈ F.

• So, all secrets are equally likely from this party's perspective In the future, we will mathematically formalize and prove the *italicized* statement above

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- Suppose yesterday morning the central authority P gets the secret s = 3
- And the central authority wants to share the secret among *n* = 4 parties
- Note that we can work over $(\mathbb{Z}_p,+, imes)$, where p=5
 - Because $\{1, \ldots, 4\} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_p^*$

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An Illustrative Example II

Execution of the Secret-sharing Algorithm

- The central authority picks a random line that passes through (0, s) = (0, 3)
- The equation of such a line looks like

$$\ell(X)=k\cdot X+3,$$

where k is an element in \mathbb{Z}_p chosen uniformly at random

- Suppose it turns out that k = 2
- Now, the shares of the four parties are the evaluation of the line $\ell(X)$ at X = 1, X = 2, X = 3, and X = 4.
- So, the secret shares of parties 1, 2, 3, and 4 are respectively

$$s_{1} = \ell(X = 1) = 2 \times 1 + 3 = 0$$

$$s_{2} = \ell(X = 2) = 2 \times 2 + 3 = 2$$

$$s_{3} = \ell(X = 3) = 2 \times 3 + 3 = 4$$

$$s_{4} = \ell(X = 4) = 2 \times 4 + 3 = 1$$

Shamir Secret Sharing

- Yesterday, at the end of the day, the central authority provided each party their respective secret share (that is, the central authority provides 0 to party 1, 2 to party 2, 4 to party 3, and 1 to party 4)
 - Note that the equation of the line $\ell(X)$ is hidden from the parties
 - All that the party i knows is that the line l(X) passes through the point (i, s_i)
- After that, parties 1, 2, 3, and 4 part ways and go to their own homes

Today, let us zoom into Party 3's home

- Party 3 has secret share 4
- To find the secret *s*, party 3 enumerates all lines passing through the point (3, 4)

$$\ell_0(X) = 0 \cdot X + 4 \ell_1(X) = 1 \cdot X + 1 \ell_2(X) = 2 \cdot X + 3 \ell_3(X) = 3 \cdot X + 0 \ell_4(X) = 4 \cdot X + 2$$

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- Note that the central authority could have picked up *any* of these lines yesterday
- Note that
 - The line l₀ has intercept 4 on the Y-axis (i.e., the evaluation of the line at X = 0),
 - The line ℓ_1 has intercept 1 on the Y-axis,
 - The line ℓ_2 has intercept 3 on the Y-axis,
 - The line ℓ_3 has intercept 0 on the Y axis, and
 - The line ℓ_4 has intercept 2 on the Y-axis
- So, it is equally likely that the central authority shared the secret 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 yesterday

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An Illustrative Example VI

Tomorrow, Party 3 decides to meet Party 1, and they will work together on reconstructing the secret. Their reconstruction steps are provided below.

- Party 1's secret share is 0, and Party 3's secret share is 4
- So, the line has to pass through the points (1,0) and (3,4)
- The slope of the line is

$$\frac{4-0}{3-1} = 4 \times (1/2)$$

= 4 × 3, because the multiplicative inverse of 2 is 3
= 2

• So, the equation of the line is of the form

$$\ell'(X) = 2 \cdot X + c$$

• And, at X = 1 the line evaluates to 0. So, the line is $\ell'(X) = 2 \cdot X + 3$

- Note that the reconstructed line is identical to the line used by the central authority!
- The intercept of the line ℓ'(X) on the Y-axis is

 š = ℓ'(X = 0) = 3, which is identical to the secret shared by the central authority!

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In the next lecture, we will see how to generalize this construction so that we can ensure that any t parties can recover the secret, and no (t-1) parties can recover the secret, where $t \in \{2, ..., p-1\}$